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Abstract. This study extensively scrutinizes 14 months of registration
data to identify large-scale malicious campaigns present in the .eu TLD.
We explore the ecosystem and modus operandi of elaborate cybercriminal
entities that recurrently register large amounts of domains for one-shot,
malicious use. Although these malicious domains are short-lived, by in-
corporating registrant information, we establish that at least 80.04% of
them can be framed in to 20 larger campaigns with varying duration
and intensity. We further report on insights in the operational aspects of
this business and observe, amongst other findings, that their processes
are only partially automated. Finally, we apply a post-factum clustering
process to validate the campaign identification process and to automate
the ecosystem analysis of malicious registrations in a TLD zone.
Keywords: malicious domain names, campaigns, DNS security
1 Introduction
The Domain Name System (DNS) is one of the key technologies that has allowed
the web to expand to its current dimensions. Virtually all communication on the
web requires the resolution of domain names to IP addresses. Malicious activi-
ties are no exception, and attackers constantly depend upon functioning domain
names to execute their abusive operations. For instance, phishing attacks, dis-
tributing spam emails, botnet command and control (C&C) connections and
malware distribution: these activities all require domain names to operate.
Widely-used domain blacklists are curated and used to stop malicious domain
names3 shortly after abusive activities have been observed and reported. As a
consequence, attackers changed to a hit-and-run strategy, in which malicious
domain names are operational for only a very small time window after the initial
registration, just for a single day in 60% of the cases [11]. Once domain names
3 We use the term malicious domain name whenever we refer to a domain name that
is registered to be bound to a malicious service or activity.
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have fulfilled their purpose, attackers can simply abandon them and register a
new set of domain names to ensure continuity of their criminal activities [24].
This strategy is economically viable to the attackers when the cost of reg-
istering a domain name is minimal. However, this approach requires repetitive
and often automated domain name registrations. We refer to these series of ma-
licious domain names registered by a single entity as campaigns. To obscure their
actions, attackers often use fake registration details and need to switch between
identities, registrars and resellers to avoid detection.
Moreover, we have observed that certain underground services pop up to
facilitate the bulk domain registration process for abusive activities. For instance,
on the darknet forum “AlphaBay”, we found several instances of “Domain and
Email Registration as a Service”. In one example4, cyber criminals register new
domain names and create fresh, private email accounts that are sold to be used
for illegal activities, such as carding.
The sheer volume of malicious domain names, as well as the fact that the
registration process is being automated and monetized, illustrates the need for
strong insights into the modus operandi of cybercriminals to produce e↵ective
countermeasures.
In this paper, we focus on the malicious campaign ecosystem by extensively
leveraging the registrant and registration details, with the goal to better under-
stand how miscreants operate to acquire a constant stream of domain names. We
rigorously investigate 14 months of .eu domain registrations, a top 10 ccTLD [15]
for the European Economic Area. Overall, the dataset of this study contains
824,121 new domain registrations; 2.53% of which have been flagged as mali-
cious by blacklisting services.
Among others, the following conclusions can be drawn from this in-depth
assessment:
1. While most malicious domains are short-lived, a large fraction of them can
be attributed to a small set of malicious actors: 80.04% of the malicious
registrations are part of just 20 long-running campaigns. We identified cam-
paigns that were active for over a year, and campaigns that registered more
than 2,000 blacklisted domains. (Section 3)
2. The campaign identification process suggests that 18.23% of malicious do-
mains does not end up on a blacklist. (Section 3.3)
3. The malicious domain registration process is only partially automated: un-
derground syndicates work along o ce hours, take holiday breaks and make
human errors while registering domains. (Section 4)
4. Ecosystem analysis can be automated and reproduced by leveraging cluster-
ing algorithms. In our experiment, the 30 largest clusters formed by agglom-
erative clustering encompass 91.48% of blacklisted campaign registrations.
These clusters exhibit a clear mapping with manually identified campaigns.
(Section 5)
4
http://pwoah7foa6au2pul.onion/forum/index.php?threads/%E2%96%
84-%E2%96%88-%E2%98%85-paperghost-%E2%98%85-%E2%96%88-%E2%96%
84-fresh-non-hacked-private-email-logins-lower-your-fraud-detection-score-2.71566
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. First, in Section 2, we
introduce the data set used in this research, along with initial insights. Next,
we perform a large scale experiment to manually identify malicious campaigns
(Section 3), followed by several analyses to gather more insights (Section 4).
In Section 5, we follow up with a method to automate campaign identification.
We discuss applications and limitations in Section 6, followed by a summary of
related work in Section 7. Lastly, we conclude this study in Section 8.
2 Datasets and initial findings
In this section, we present the data used in this research and give initial insights
based on a first, high-level analysis.
2.1 Registration data
We analyzed 824,121 .eu domain registrations between April 1, 2015 and May
31, 2016. We inspected the following fields:
Basic registration information contains the domain name, the date and
time of registration, and the registrar via which the registration happened.
Contact information of the registrant contains the company name, name,
the language, email address, phone, fax, as well as postal address information.
We decomposed two additional attributes from the email address: the email
account and the email provider.
Nameservers or glue records that are responsible for resolving entries within
the domain. We enriched the nameserver data with their geographical location
by resolving the NS records and adding IP geolocation data.
2.2 Blacklists
To capture whether or not a domain was used in malicious activity, a set of
public blacklists was queried on a daily basis. Each new domain is monitored
daily during 1 month after registration. Afterwards, all domains were checked
once more 4 months after the last registration in our dataset. The following
blacklist services have been used:
dbl.spamhaus.org blacklist [21]. This Spamhaus blacklist is queried us-
ing their DNS API, and provides indicators for botnet C&C domains, malware
domains, phishing domains, and spam domains.
multi.surbl.org blacklist [20]. SURBL features a combination of di↵erent
lists, such as abuse, phishing, malware, etc. The combined SURBL list is queried
over DNS.
Google’s Safe Browsing list [7]. Google’s Safe Browsing list is queried
via a Web API, and provides indicators for malware domains, phishing domains,
and domains hosting unwanted software, as described in [8].
2.3 Preliminary insights
Given the data described above, we present a preliminary analysis to provide
insights in the general trends and patterns of malicious registrations.
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Fig. 1: Weekly share of malicious and all registrations over time.
Observing the 824,121 registrations that occurred between April 1, 2015 and
May 31, 2016, we find that 2.53% end up on a blacklist. This corresponds to a
total of 20,870 registrations used by cyber criminals in the given 14 month time
span. Figure 1 shows the weekly share of both malicious and all registrations over
this period. The di↵erences in intensity of malicious registrations are moderately
correlated with those of all registrations (⇢ = 0.54). However, the variance of
malicious registrations is clearly much larger. Most of the increased malicious
activity, for instance at the start of February 2016, can be attributed to a single
malicious campaign. These cases are discussed in depth in Section 3.
The selected blacklists return metadata that encode the reason(s) why a
particular domain name was flagged. In our records, 93.68% of the blacklisted
domains in the dataset is labelled for spam, 2.09% for malware infrastructure,
0.57% for unwanted software, and 3.22% for phishing activities.
Most domains appear on blacklists very shortly after their registration. More
specifically, 72.93% of malicious domains were flagged within 5 days of dele-
gation. 98.57% of malicious registrations are listed on a blacklist in their first
month.
3 Campaign identification experiment
Typically, illegal online activities do not occur in an isolated or dispersed fash-
ion [5,11]. Instead, malicious actors commonly set up campaigns that involve
multiple, tightly related abusive strategies, techniques and targets. Through an
in-depth, a posteriori analysis of the .eu dataset, we assessed whether such pat-
terns can be identified between domain registrations and to what extent these
registrations happen in bulk.
Ultimately, we manually identified 20 distinct campaigns responsible for the
vast majority of malicious registrations. A campaign represents a series of reg-
istrations over time, with strong similarities in terms of registration data (e.g.
the registrar, the registrant’s address information, phone number or email ad-
dress, and the set of nameservers). Moreover, a campaign can most probably be
attributed to a single individual or organization. In this section, we first give a
more thorough description on how these campaigns were identified, followed by
some general insights into their characteristics.
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Fig. 2: Daily percentage of malicious registrations, including and excluding cam-
paign registrations. The dotted lines represent the highest daily concentration
of both sets.
3.1 Campaign identification process
As malicious registrations often occur in batches [11,10], high temporal concen-
trations can serve as a preliminary indicator of campaign activity. Figure 2 plots
the relative amount of malicious registrations on each day. That graph can be
used to identify the time periods in which the amount of malicious registrations
was surging. If a campaign was responsible for a high concentration of malicious
registrations, a substantial subset of registrations within that timeframe should
be related to each other. Hence, all malicious registrations that occurred in that
time span are examined to find common characteristics in the registration data.
These can be recurring values or distinct patterns in the email address, the ad-
dress info, the registrar, the registrant name, etc. To detect useful outliers, we
visualized correlations between registration fields. For example, by plotting the
email providers of the registrants versus the country listed in their street ad-
dress (as shown in Figure 3), multiple hotspots of malicious registrations can
be found that contribute to one or more campaigns. These unique combinations
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Fig. 3: Malicious registrations, grouped by email provider and country of the
registrant. For visibility, combinations with less that 50 registrations are left out
of the figure. Moreover, email providers with less than 50 distinct email addresses
in the dataset have been obfuscated for privacy reasons.
and patterns form the basis of the manually assigned campaign selection criteria.
To evaluate these, we apply them to the full dataset, i.e. on both benign and
blacklisted registrations, over all 14 months. If the criteria match multiple active
days and contain a substantial number of blacklisted domains, they are withheld
as a new campaign. This process was repeated iteratively, reducing the number
of malicious concentrations each time.
Over the complete dataset, we identify 20 distinct campaigns. A variety of
attributes of the registration details have been used to characterize a campaign,
the specifics for each campaign are listed in Table 1.
3.2 General campaign observations
The activity of the 20 identified campaigns is depicted in Figure 4. A first ob-
servation is that most of the campaigns are long-living: only one campaign runs
for less than a month, while some campaigns run up to a year and more5.
Secondly, campaigns strongly vary in their activity patterns. Some campaigns
are active on almost a daily basis (e.g. campaign c 19), whereas others only have
a few distinct active days throughout their lifetime (e.g. campaign c 07). Simi-
5 Note that some campaigns might be running even longer than 372 days, as they
might have been active before the starting date of our dataset (campaigns c 01 -
c 05) or they may still be active past the time span that is covered in our dataset.
Table 1: Attributes used to express the selection criteria of a campaign.
l represents a string match, and I a regular expression pattern.
Campaign
Criteria 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
domain name – – – – I – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –
registrar – – – l – – – – l – – l – – l – – – – l
nameservers – – – I – – – l – – – – – – I – – – – l
name I – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –
address – l l I – l – – – – – – l l I l – – – –
organization I – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –
email account – – I I – – l – – – – I – – – – – – l –
email provider l – l l l – l – l l l – – – I l – l l l
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Fig. 4: Campaign duration and activity over time. The black lines represent the
overall duration of the campaign, while the black dots indicate the number of
malicious registrations on that day.
larly, campaigns vary in concentration. An intense, six week campaign was for in-
stance responsible for almost 2,000 new registrations (c 20), whereas one steady
campaign ran over 10 months and produced only 154 malicious registrations
(c 13).
A third observation is that campaigns contribute to a large fraction of mali-
cious registrations found in the .eu registration data. Together, the 20 campaigns
cover 16,704 domain registrations, that appeared on blacklists. This represents
80.04% of the 20,780 blacklisted registrations in our dataset.
Lastly, not all registrations identified as part of a campaign are flagged as
malicious. In total, 19.30% of the campaign registrations we identified are not
known as abusive domains by blacklisting services. A more in-depth analysis of
these potential false positives is discussed in Section 3.3. Note that to avoid any
bias, Figure 4 only include registrations that appeared on blacklists, and thus
represent a lower bound of campaign activity.
3.3 Validation of campaign selection criteria
As briefly mentioned in the previous section, 19.30% of the registrations asso-
ciated with malicious campaigns do not appear on blacklists. We expect that
various reasons contribute to this mismatch:
1. Incomplete coverage by blacklists. As blacklists are not exhaustive or-
acles, we expect that certain domains in a campaign may simply not have
been picked up by the specific set of blacklists used.
2. Not abused. It is possible that a number of campaign registrations simply
has not been used for malicious purposes (yet).
3. False positives. Some of our campaign criteria might not be strict enough,
introducing false positive matches.
Figure 5 depicts in red the percentage of registrations for each individual
campaign that appears on a blacklist. There are three campaigns with less than
60% of their registrations blacklisted: c 05, c 11 and c 15. In the remainder
of this section we validate the quality of the campaign selection criteria. We
attempt to gauge the real false positive rate by inspecting domains belonging
to campaigns, but do not appear on blacklists. A high false positive rate would
imply that the selection criteria are imprecise and include a significant set of
domains that were registered without any malicious intent. In contrast, a very
high true positive rate implies that the selection criteria are substantially more
exhaustive in defining domains with malicious intent compared to blacklisting
services.
Transitive attribution. To assess the prevalence of incomplete blacklists and
not-active malicious domains, we examine the registrant data of false positives
in order to find undeniable traces that connect them to malicious domains. We
base this transitive attribution on phone numbers as these are uniquely assigned
identifiers that were never used in our campaign selection criteria. Thus, if the
registrant’s phone number is identical to that of a blacklisted registration, we
consider the domain name to be part of the malicious campaign and assume that
it has either not been abused yet, or was not picked up by a blacklist. In total,
3,252 campaign domains are transitively considered as malicious. As shown in
yellow in Figure 5, 14 of the 20 identified campaigns are thereby completely
validated.
A threat to using phone numbers to identify malicious registrants arises when
an attacker retrieves the WHOIS information of a legitimate .eu domain and
falsely uses it for his own registration. With three small experiments, we try to
invalidate the presence of this scenario in the transitive attributed set. Firstly,
we measure the time interval between the registration time of a transitively at-
tributed domain and of the blacklisted domain that it was associated with. We
find that for 2,058 domains, the malicious registration (with the same phone
number) occurred within 60 seconds of the transitively attributed registration.
We argue that it is virtually impossible for an attacker to observe a new regis-
tration (which is non-public information in the .eu zone), query its WHOIS data
and subsequently make a similar registration in that time interval. In a second
experiment, we argue that an attacker would not exploit a benign registrant’s
information if those contact details are already tainted. In that regard, we filter
out 965 of the remaining domains that were registered after a prior registration
with the same phone number was already blacklisted. Lastly, we consult a phone
number verification tool [22] and identify invalid phone numbers for 189 of the
229 remaining domains. We presume that a malicious actor would not steal be-
nign registrant details with an invalid phone number while attempting to mimic
a legitimate registrant. In the end, we observe one of these three indicators for
3,212 (98.77%) of the transitively attributed domains and conclude that this
attribution is justified.
In-depth analysis of campaign c 15. After the transitive attribution step,
still 30.6% of the registrations in campaign c 15 remain potential false positives.
This set of domain names is further investigated.
Within campaign c 15, all domain names are composed of concatenated
Dutch words (mostly 2 words, but sometimes up to 4). The same words are
frequently reused, indicating that a limited dictionary was used to generate the
domain names. The remaining 583 potential false positives domain names were
split up by a native Dutch speaker in segments of existing words. 396 of these
unflagged domain names turned out to be exclusively constructed out of Dutch
words used in blacklisted domains of the campaign. As this is a very specific
pattern, these domains have been labeled as validated true positive. The remain-
ing domain names had either one word segment in common (172 domains) or
no common word at all (15 domains). Thereafter, a new iteration of transitive
attribution strategy was applied on that remaining set. Hereby, 147 registrations
shared a phone number with the previously validated registrations, reducing the
potential false positives to just 40 registrations.
Interstingly, we find that 95 out of the 98 registrant names that are used in
c 15 can be generated with on of the the Laravel Faker generator tool forks [16]
using its nl-NL language option.
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Fig. 5: Extended false positive analysis of each campaign.
Manual analysis of the remaining false positives. After the transitive
attribution and the analysis of c 15, the residual potential false positives in all
campaigns were further investigated manually, by querying DNS records, visiting
websites, and searching on blacklists (e.g. URLVoid [23]) and search engines.
Only two additional domains could be validated as true positives: one registration
in campaign c 04 was identified as a phishing website by FortiGuard [6], and one
registration in campaign c 15 sent out unsolicited to a temporary email account
on email-fake.com.
Summary of validation. Of the 20,698 campaign registrations, 16,704 do-
mains (80.73%) were flagged by blacklisting services, 3,252 registrations (15.71%)
were linked to malicious domains via transitive attribution, and 552 (2.67%) have
been manually validated as registered with malicious intent.
To conclude, the campaign selection criteria resulted in only 190 potential
false positives (i.e. 0.92%). This is a strong indicator that the selection criteria
are su ciently accurate to perform a representative analysis and to give us the
necessary insights into the malicious domain ecosystem.
4 Insights into malicious campaigns
In this section, we discuss several interesting observations regarding malicious
campaigns, found during our assessment.
Abuse indicators and categories Overall, the vast majority of blacklisted
domains (93.68%) were associated with spam domains. As listed in Table 2, all
campaigns follow this general distribution, except for c 19 where nearly 28% is
linked to botnet C&C servers.
Spamhaus DBL and SURBL are the two abuse sources that cover the largest
number of domains. While there is a considerable overlap, both are required to
get an exhaustive coverage of all campaigns. In particular, c 1 and c 19 are exclu-
sively flagged by just one of the two sources. Interestingly, Google Safe Browsing
was not involved in flagging domains in any of the campaigns. Presumably, Safe
Browsing focuses more on malware delivery, as opposed to malicious infrastruc-
ture.
Cross-campaign characteristics. Some interesting characteristics exist across
multiple campaigns. For instance, c 03, c 04 and c 20 generate the registrant’s
email address from its name followed with a numerical su x. Similarly, the
registered domain names in c 05 and c 11 follow clear character patterns with
numerical su xes. Another returning peculiarity is the discrepancy between the
registrant’s street address and his country. c 07, c 9, c 13 and c 14 use valid
street addresses located outside of Europe (US and Panama) in combination
with a European country (Norway, Ireland and others). Presumably, this is to
partly confuse the residential requirements for registering a .eu domain. In the
Table 2: The di↵erent types of abuse, the blacklists and registration timing
patterns per campaign. A small fraction of blacklisted domains has a missing
abuse type. The max. burst represents the highest number of registrations that
occurred within a 60-second time span.
Abuse types Blacklist sources Registration timing patterns
Campaign Spam Botnet Malware Phishing Unwanted Spamhaus SURBL
Google
SB
Day of week
(Mon-Sun)
Hour of day
(00-23h)
Max.
burst
c 01 100.00% 100.00% 99
c 02 100.00% 100.00% 27.53% 59
c 03 100.00% 99.48% 86.82% 51
c 04 99.88% 0.12% 1.38% 99.64% 76.26% 28
c 05 83.05% 12.99% 77.97% 9
c 06 100.00% 87.63% 12.37% 3
c 07 91.40% 91.40% 1.08% 10
c 08 100.00% 100.00% 3.70% 19
c 09 99.63% 0.12% 1.97% 99.26% 28.45% 46
c 10 99.20% 1.60% 78.40% 90.40% 48
c 11 85.18% 0.08% 16.00% 77.02% 59
c 12 99.59% 0.20% 99.39% 74.29% 23
c 13 96.75% 81.82% 19.48% 1
c 14 100.00% 84.43% 86.05% 132
c 15 97.28% 73.35% 33.46% 13
c 16 100.00% 0.12% 100.00% 43.71% 8
c 17 100.00% 100.00% 8.83% 18
c 18 99.85% 0.15% 99.77% 28.04% 10
c 19 72.07% 27.93% 100.00% 5
c 20 99.29% 0.96% 99.14% 7.58% 19
All malicious 93.68% 1.27% 0.85% 3.22% 0.57% 81.07% 50.04% 1.81%
case of c 10, a fixed street address is listed throughout the campaign while 10
di↵erent countries are combined with it.
Registration process is not fully automated. While performing the in-
depth analysis of the malicious domain registrations, we found multiple indica-
tions that the malicious registration process in (at least some of) the campaigns
is not fully automated: syndicates work along o ce hours and make human
errors while registering domains.
O ce hours and holiday breaks. As expected, the overall registrations in the
.eu zone follow a weekly pattern. Figure 6 demonstrates this by zooming into 1
month of registrations. During weekends, a significantly smaller amount of reg-
istrations occurs than during the week. On average, week days have 2.34 times
more registrations than weekend days. For blacklisted registrations, the di↵er-
ence is even more prominent. During weekend days, 3.85 times less malicious
registrations occur as compared to weekdays. Moreover, several weekend days
have no blacklisted registrations at all. Table 2 displays this behavior separately
for each campaign.
As already mentioned in Section 2, the distribution over time of malicious
registrations is much more fluctuating than those of all registrations (Figure 1).
Interestingly, the longer drops in malicious registration activity coincide with
holiday periods. The most significant one starts at the first week of July and
continues for several weeks, concurring with the summer holidays. The other
major periods of recess correspond to Labour day weekend (May 1), the Christ-
mas holidays (last week of December) and the beginning of Lent or Carnival
(mid-February).
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Fig. 6: Daily share of all and malicious registrations between April 1, 2015 and
April 20, 2015. A clear weekly pattern is measured for both.
There are multiple hypotheses to explain these registration patterns:
1. Malicious actors might deliberately mimic normal registration patterns to
avoid detection.
2. There might be a lower demand for new malicious domains during holidays,
when potential victims are less active online.
3. Cybercriminal activities could be managed as any other business and are
therefore equally susceptible to vacation periods.
To substantiate the latter hypothesis, we also zoomed in into the variation in
registration time per campaign. Interestingly, as shown in Table 2 displays this
separately for each campaign, we identified that some of the campaigns clearly
align with a typical day at the o ce. For instance, in campaign c 11 and c 18
syndicates are working 8 to 10 hours a day, and the daily pattern of c 11 even
suggests that there is su cient time to take a lunch break. In contrast, the daily
registration pattern of campaign c 19, further illustrated in Figure 7, hints at a
more automated process. The vast majority of registrations are made daily at
midnight and 1 PM. Furthermore, campaigns such as c 14 are registering at a
rate up to 132 new domains per minute, suggesting underlying automation.
Minor inconsistencies in the data. We observe a number of inconsistencies in
several registration details of certain campaigns. These inconsistencies could be
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Fig. 7: Times of registrations for campaign c 19. Note the impact of daylight
saving time starting from the last Sunday of March.
the consequence of small errors or typos, suggesting that some of the data has
been manually entered into scripts or registration forms, or that di↵erent input
validation rules have been applied by registrars or resellers.
As listed in Table 3, we encounter a few cases where registration fields be-
longing to the same registrant vary typographically inside a single campaign.
In campaign c 15, we also observed registrant names for which the name
field has been filled inconsistently, leading to name patterns such as Lastname
Lastname or Firstname Firstname Lastname.
Table 3: Minor inconsistencies found in the registration details campaign do-
mains. Some registration details have been obfuscated for privacy reasons.
Attribute Inconsistencies
c 04 street P.O BOX 3...4 P.O BOX 3...4,
c 11 city AIX EN PROVENCE AIX-EN-PROVENCE
c 11 street 1... ROUTE D AVIGNON 1... ROUTE D’AVIGNON
c 16 street 947 C...R 9457 C...R
Adaptive registration strategies. Several campaigns alter their strategies
throughout their lifetime. For instance, five campaigns have registered domains
via multiple registrars: c 01, c 03, c 11, c 12 and c 16. Figure 8 illustrates how
campaign c 11 sequentially changes between 4 registrars over the entire duration
of the campaign. Malicious actors might change registrars for economic reasons
(cheaper domain registrations) or to evade detection. Alternatively, the change
in registrar can be triggered by an intermediate reseller that changes registrar.
Table 4 lists for each campaign the amount of adaptive registration details
that were used throughout its lifespan. While five campaigns use just a single
phone number and email address, the large majority leverage multiple registra-
tion details. The email providers that are categorized as “Campaign” indicate
that a domain name that was registered as part of the campaign, was later used
as the email provider for a new registration.
As primary indicators of evasion sophistication, we list two metrics. Firstly,
we give the maximum number of domains for which a campaign has reused a
single phone number or email address. Secondly, we measure the longest pe-
riod during which a registrants phone or email address has been reused. c 15,
c 12 and c 8 demonstrate the highest sophistication in terms of minimizing the
reuse of registrant details. However, c 15 uses many di↵erent self-registered email
providers and only reuses details sparsely over a long period. In other words, they
leverage a more elaborate strategy than c 12 and c 8, where registrant details
seem to be automatically generated in a hit-and-run fashion The success of c 15’s
strategy is supported by its low blacklist presence. In contrast, c 2, c 11 and c 18
deploy exhibit more simple and high-volume strategies.
Table 4: The amount of registrars, phone numbers, email addresses and types of
email providers used per campaign.
Campaign
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Nb of registrars 3 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 2 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 1
Nb of phones 4 3 19 54 1 2 1 29 14 1 2 29 1 1 97 8 1 4 1 13
Max domains per phone 338 1026 385 169 177 158 93 20 590 125 1220 24 154 989 16 372 283 1265 752 237
Max phone usage (days) 90 71 69 276 129 1 359 2 155 204 246 15 307 41 232 147 50 75 226 35
Nb of email addresses 6 18 71 54 177 2 1 29 13 1 2 29 29 1 98 8 1 4 1 14
Max domains per email 263 103 68 169 1 158 93 20 590 125 1240 24 126 989 16 373 283 1265 752 237
Max email usage (days) 50 8 14 267 – 1 359 2 155 204 157 15 255 41 232 147 50 75 226 35
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Fig. 8: Registrations per day and per registrar of campaign c 11.
Related campaigns. By searching for overlaps between campaigns in their
registrants’ details, as well as temporal characteristics (simultaneous or chained
activity), we have identified that several campaigns are likely related to each
other:
– c 02 and c 03 have registrants with the same phone number
– c 08 and c 12 have registrants with the same phone number, email and ad-
dress
– c 16 and c 18 have registrants with the same address
Similarly, the abrupt ending of campaigns c 01, c 02 and c 03 suggest that
these campaigns might be of the same actor, or depend on the same reseller or
registrar that ended their service.
Most active malicious actors. Table 5 gives the highest represented mali-
cious registrars, registrants and email providers in our dataset. Most surprisingly,
49.6% of all the malicious domain names are registered with one single registrar.
Furthermore, it used by half of all the campaigns we identified. We argue that
this registrar is either very flexible in accepting registrations, or has the most in-
teresting price setting for bulk registrants. Note that this registrar only accounts
for 2.27% of all benign registrations. This observation confirms earlier findings
in [13,11] that a handful of registrars accounts for the majority of spammer
domains.
The most used malicious email providers are all popular public webmail
providers. The situation is di↵erent compared to the registrars as gmail.com
has the largest share of malicious registrations but also well-represented in be-
nign registrations. In contrast, aol.com and yahoo.com do have a large fraction
of malicious registrations.
Over 3,000 malicious registrations can be attributed to just 3 registrants who
are predominantly malicious. Related to the reasoning in Section 3.3, we suspect
that non-blacklisted registrations of these registrants are likely malicious as well.
Table 5: Top 3 most malicious registrars, email providers and registrants. For
each entry, we list their contribution to all malicious and benign registrations,
their toxicity and the campaigns that are associated with them. The toxicity
expresses the percentage of malicious registrations within that entity.
Nb of Contribution
malicious Malicious Benign Toxicity Associated campaigns
1. registrar 5 10,353 49.61% 2.27% 36.25% 1 2 3 4 9 10 12 13 14 17
2. registrar 3 3,004 14.39% 2.64% 12.41% 3 7 8 12 16 18
3. registrar 7 2,327 11.15% 0.46% 38.67% 20
1. gmail.com 4,221 20.23% 24.79% 2.08% 4 14 19
2. yahoo.com 3,348 16.04% 1.49% 21.85% 2 3 4 8 20
3. aol.com 2,134 10.23% 0.31% 46.28% 8 9
1. m...s@c...k.com 1,265 6.06% 0.00% 99.37% 18
2. abuse@j...n.com 1,240 5.94% 0.12% 54.89% 11
3. n...t@gmail.com 989 4.74% 0.01% 95.37% 14
5 Automating campaign identification
In the previous section, we discussed a large-scale experiment in which we man-
ually identified large campaigns from a corpus of malicious registrations. The
criteria that defined these campaigns were mainly recurring registrant and name-
server details. In this section, we use that knowledge to automate the campaign
identification process by using a clustering algorithm. The results serve to both
validate the manual experiment, as well as to demonstrate the capabilities of
automatic campaign identification to aid ecosystem analyses in TLDs.
5.1 Clustering process
Algorithm. Agglomerative clustering is chosen as the basis to perform auto-
matic campaign identification. It is a hierarchical clustering algorithm that works
by iteratively merging the two clusters that are closest to each other [12]. We
adopt the complete linkage criterion to determine the distance between clusters.
Using this criterion, the distance is equal to that of the most dissimilar instances
of both clusters, promoting a high density. There are two main reasons for opting
for agglomerative clustering.
1. The algorithm does not require a predetermined number of clusters, allowing
us to statistically evaluate the optimal number of clusters afterwards.
2. Given the results from Section 3, we presume that about 80% of malicious
domains can be grouped into clusters. Agglomerative clustering allows the
remaining independent domains to have their own singleton cluster, without
necessarily polluting the large clusters.
Feature set. For each of the 20,870 blacklisted registrations, we extract 13 fea-
tures. There are two general registration features, domain length and regis-
trar. Next, we have ten registrant features: name, street, city, region, country,
zip code, phone number, email account and email provider. Lastly, two name-
server features were included, the nameserver domain names and their geo-
graphical location.
Agglomerative clustering uses the Euclidean distance measure to calculate
the distance between two instances. However, except for domain length and
address score, all features in our set are categorical, not numeric. In order to
accommodate these features, we apply one-hot encoding [18]: for each possible
category in our set, a new binary feature is created. Each instance that carried
that value will receive a value of 1 in the new binary encoded feature, all others
are set to 0. Naturally, one-hot encoding dramatically increases the number of
features, more specifically from 13 to 30,843.
Cuto↵ selection. Agglomerative clustering has no predefined stopping criteria
and merges clusters until only one remains. Using the campaign labels from the
manual analysis in Section 3, we calculate the V-measure after each merging
step to statistically express the mapping between clusters and campaigns. The
V-measure is the harmonic mean of the homogeneity and completeness score [19].
The former is a metric that represents how homogeneous each cluster is in terms
of campaign labels, the latter measures whether the instances of a certain label
are all assigned to the same cluster6. The highest V-measure is observed at a
cuto↵ of 432 clusters, where the homogeneity is 0.90 and the completeness score
0.86.
6 For instances without campaign labels, the registrant’s phone numbers are set as
their label.
5.2 Results
In the selected model, very large clusters have formed. Namely, 80% of domains
reside in the 39 largest clusters, while a long tail of 227 clusters consisting out
of only 5 registrations or less. In other words, the clustering algorithm forms a
Pareto distribution similar to the manual campaign identification in Section 4.
Furthermore, the top 30 clusters represent 91.48% of blacklisted registrations
that reside within the 20 manually identified campaigns.
Using Figure 9, we analyze the top 30 largest clusters and their correlation to
the campaign labels from the manual analysis. The clustering algorithm largely
aligns with the manual campaign identification, with most clusters mapping to
a single campaign. The notable exceptions being the two largest clusters. The
first cluster encompasses 2,052 domains of both c 02 and c 03. This is in line
with our previous speculation (Section 4) that c 02 and c 03 are related given
their synchronized ending and the fact that they share registrants with the same
phone number. The same is true for the second cluster, as both c 16 and c 18
clearly share registrants with the same address.
Cluster 16 is the only automatically identified cluster that solely exists out
of domains without campaign labels. When inspecting those domains, we find
that this cluster is likely related to or part of c 20. More specifically, their active
days align and the same registrar is used for all registrations in both sets, as
shown in the bottom part of Figure 10.
Several clusters also contain a small amount of instances without a campaign
label. We distinguish two cases: instances that closely align to a campaign, but
were not selected because of too narrow selection criteria; and instances that
have no campaign a nity, but are most probably merged because the clustering
algorithm has executed too many merges. The former are labeled as (Related)
in Figure 9, the latter as (Unrelated).
18 of the 20 manually identified campaigns are represented in the top 30
clusters. The smallest identified campaign, c 07, is not found in this subset of
clusters because it is simply too small. Cluster 30 contains 110 domains, more
than c 07 encompasses as a whole. However, we find that c 07 is completely and
homogeneously represented by the 35th cluster. The second campaign that is
missing is c 15. As mentioned in Section 3.3, this campaign was selected by a
unique and complex address formatting pattern. Since the clustering algorithm
only performs binary matches on these fields, it is less e↵ective at detecting
these more advanced similarities. As shown in the top part of Figure 10, c 15
is spread out over 18 clusters, that essentially represent 18 di↵erent registrants
that are reused throughout the campaign. The a nity between those clusters is
clear when considering their active days.
In conclusion, the manual and automatic campaign identification results align
to a large extent. We find that, when performing automatic detection using clus-
tering, we achieve a more exhaustive identification of clear similarities as opposed
to manual identification (e.g. cluster 16). However, the automatic approach has
di culties to detect more advanced similarity patterns (e.g. c 15). In future
work, more sophisticated techniques, such as n-grams, can be integrated into
the clustering algorithm to detect more advanced similarity patterns.
In general, the outcome of the clustering algorithm both validates the ap-
proach of the manual analysis, as well as demonstrates the capabilities of auto-
matic and reproducible campaign identification using registrant and nameserver
details.
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Fig. 9: Mapping of the top 30 clusters to campaign instances. The bottom two
rows represent domains without a campaign label: the (Related) row groups the
registrations that closely align with campaigns, the (Unrelated) groups registra-
tions without campaign a nity. The clusters are ranked from large to small.
6 Discussion and limitations
In this section, we want to discuss the relevance and applications, as well as the
limitations of our study.
Applications. Given the exploratory nature of this research, we anticipate
several applications and next steps.
The relevance of this work is not limited to .eu domains. Presumably, mali-
cious actors do not restrict their potential to a single TLD. Furthermore, bulk
registrations can be made across multiple TLDs using the same registrar. There-
fore, the findings and methods described in this paper can most likely be applied
to other or across TLDs. To reproduce this study, access to registrant and name-
server details of registrations is required. This data can generally be obtained
by downloading zone files and WHOIS data.
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Additionally, we demonstrate that automatic campaign identification using
clustering is a feasible strategy. Moreover, 18.38% of registrations in the identified
campaigns are not present on blacklists. This entices interesting opportunities
to extend the coverage of blacklists. Although the proposed system relies on a
post-factum analysis, it could create opportunities to stop ongoing campaigns.
Limitations. We note four limitations and potential validity threats.
Firstly, the main subjects of this research are domain names that are reg-
istered with malicious intent. However, backlists also contain legitimate regis-
trations that have been compromised later on. We argue that the prevalence
of these cases is minimal, since 98.57% of blacklisted registrations were already
flagged within the first 30 days of registration. Furthermore, compromised be-
nign domains would appear as outliers in our data and could thus hardly pollute
campaign analyses.
Secondly, both the manual and automatic identification rely on patterns in
the registration data. Malicious actors can leverage this dependency by con-
stantly using di↵erent registration data and patterns. However, the cost for at-
tackers would increase to achieve this higher level of circumvention. Furthermore,
it is hard not to exhibit any pattern when performing bulk registrations (same
registrars, time patterns, fake identity generating tools,...).
Additionally, several registrars o↵er anonymization services to their cus-
tomers, obscuring the registrant contact information to the registry. Evidently,
this diminishes the ability to di↵erentiate between registrations and conceals in-
formation that can be used to identify domains registered by the same entity.
In the case of .eu, the use of such obfuscation services is not allowed by the
registry’s terms and conditions. During our analysis, we find that such services
were only deployed by c 05 which could have impacted this campaign.
Finally, our research is based on a set of publicly available blacklists that are,
at least to some extent, incomplete. A more complete ground truth would likely
improve the performance of our approach.
7 Related work
Prior to our research, Hao et al. [11] studied the domain registration behavior
of spammers. They reported that most spam domains are very short-lived. More
specifically, 60% of these domains were active for only a single day. Spammers
are registering many “single-shot” domains to minimize interference by black-
lists. To counter this strategy, the authors explore various features on which
spam domains exhibit distinctive behavior. For instance, in contrast with be-
nign registrations, they find that malicious domains are more often registered in
batches.Recently, Hao et al. implemented many features discussed in that prior
work to create a machine learning-based predictor capable of detecting malicious
domains at time-of-registration [10]. The three most dominant features of their
classifier are authoritative nameservers, trigrams in domain names and the IP
addresses of nameservers.
While both papers approach malicious domains as a two-class problem (be-
nign vs. malicious registrations), many of their features essentially depend on
returning characteristics of di↵erent underlying malicious campaigns. In this
work, we are the first to shift the focus to the campaigns itself, exploring their
modus operandi and di↵erent identifying characteristics.
A method related to ours was proposed by Felegyhzi et al. [5], who investi-
gated the feasibility of proactive domain blacklisting, by inferring other malicious
registrations from known-bad domains through shared nameservers and identical
registration times. The proposed system shortens the time required to blacklist
malicious domains, while providing important insights regarding the similarities
of registrations within campaigns. Additionally, Cova et al. [4] indentified dif-
ferent rogue antivirus campaigns by looking at the hosting infrastructure and
registration details (including the registrant’s email) of di↵erent domains.
Related studies concentrate on DNS tra c of newly registered domains to
characterize malicious behaviour [3,9,1,2,14]. These systems mainly focus on the
initial operational DNS patterns of domain names.
Other important e↵orts regarding malicious domains come from the study
of domain generation algorithms (DGAs). Recent work by Plohmann et al. [17]
demonstrates the increasing importance of understanding DGAs to thwart C&C
communication. Using reimplementations of these algorithms, the authors exe-
cute forward generation of domain lists, which enables proactive identification
of C&C domains.
8 Conclusion
In this study, we analyzed the maliciously-flagged .eu registrations over a 14-
month period. This paper is the first to extensively dissect the underbelly of
malicious registrations using registrant details to identify its operational com-
ponents, namely campaigns. We explored the ecosystem and modus operandi of
elaborate malicious actors that register massive amounts of domains for short-
lived, malicious use.
By searching for shared characteristics, we established that at least 80.04%
of all malicious registrations can be attributed to 20 campaigns with varying
duration and intensity. Moreover, the coverage of blacklists can be extended by
19.30%, using the information from the campaign identification. After a rigorous
evaluation, we are able to confirm that the vast majority of these previously un-
detected registrations are genuinely related to malicious activity; at most 0.92%
are false positive registrations.
Our study demonstrates the potential to leverage the registrant details and
other registration characteristics to identify large campaigns. Aided by an auto-
matic identification process, this insight can be used to easily track and interfere
with massive, long-running campaigns and to preemptively extend blacklists
with malicious domains that have yet to be actively used by a cybercriminal.
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